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Moral dumbfounding is defined as maintaining a moral judgement, without supporting reasons. The most 
cited demonstration of dumbfounding does not identify a specific measure of dumbfounding and has 
not been published in peer-review form, or directly replicated. Despite limited empirical examination, 
dumbfounding has been widely discussed in moral psychology. The present research examines the reliability 
with which dumbfounding can be elicited, and aims to identify measureable indicators of dumbfounding. 
Study 1 aimed at establishing the effect that is reported in the literature. Participants read four scenarios 
and judged the actions described. An Interviewer challenged participants’ stated reasons for judgements. 
Dumbfounding was evoked, as measured by two indicators, admissions of not having reasons (17%), 
unsupported declarations (9%) with differences between scenarios. Study 2 measured dumbfounding as 
the selecting of an unsupported declaration as part of a computerised task. We observed high rates of 
dumbfounding across all scenarios. Studies 3a (college sample) and 3b (MTurk sample), addressing limitations 
in Study 2, replaced the unsupported declaration with an admission of having no reason, and included open-
ended responses that were coded for unsupported declarations. As predicted, lower rates of dumbfounding 
were observed (3a 20%; 3b 16%; or 3a 32%; 3b 24% including unsupported declarations in open-ended 
responses). Two measures provided evidence for dumbfounding across three studies; rates varied with task 
type (interview/computer task), and with the particular measure being employed (admissions of not having 
reasons/unsupported declarations). Possible cognitive processes underlying dumbfounding and limitations 
of methodologies used are discussed as a means to account for this variability.
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Moral dumbfounding occurs when people stubbornly 
maintain a moral judgement, even though they can provide 
no reason to support their judgements (Haidt, 2001; Haidt, 
Björklund, & Murphy, 2000; Prinz, 2005). It typically 
manifests as a state of confusion or puzzlement coupled 
with (a) an admission of not having reasons or (b) the use of 
unsupported declarations (“It’s just wrong!”) as justification 
for a judgement (Haidt & Hersh, 2001; Haidt et al., 2000), 
particularly, when people encounter taboo behaviours that 
do not result in any harm. The classic and most commonly 
cited example involves an act of consensual incest between 
a brother and sister with the use of contraceptive (Incest). 
Another example (Cannibal) involves an act of cannibalism 
with a body that is already dead and is due to be incinerated 
the next day (Haidt et al., 2000).1
Defining and Measuring Moral Dumbfounding
Definitions of moral dumbfounding vary within the moral 
psychology literature. It was originally defined as “the 
stubborn and puzzled maintenance of a judgment without 
supporting reasons” (Haidt & Björklund, 2008, p. 197; 
see also, Haidt & Hersh, 2001, p. 194; Haidt et al., 2000, 
p. 2). Some authors cite the original definition verbatim 
(e.g., Jacobson, 2012; Royzman, Kim, & Leeman, 2015); 
others include the maintenance of a moral judgement 
despite the absence of supporting reason, but omit any 
reference to stubbornness or puzzlement (e.g., Cushman, 
Young, & Hauser, 2006; Dwyer, 2009; Gray, Schein, & 
Ward, 2014; Haidt, 2007; Wielenberg, 2014); and some 
refer to confidence in the judgement, but again, omit any 
reference to stubbornness or puzzlement (e.g., Cushman, 
Young, & Greene, 2010; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Kang-
Xing Jin, & Mikhail, 2007; Hauser, Young, & Cushman, 
2008; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003; Sneddon, 2007).
It is apparent from the literature that there is no 
single, agreed definition of moral dumbfounding. That 
said, an absence of reasons for, or an inability to justify 
or defend, a moral judgement, is consistently identified 
across definitions. However, even despite this apparent 
consistency, there remains considerable variation in the 
language used to describe this “failure to provide reasons 
for a moral judgement”. Indeed, the lack of definitional 
specificity has led to differing interpretations of moral 
dumbfounding. It also allows for the possibility of 
disagreement relating to the implications, both theoretical 
and practical, of moral dumbfounding.
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According to the original definition, moral 
dumbfounding is “the stubborn and puzzled maintenance 
of a judgment without supporting reasons” (Haidt et al., 
2000, p. 2). This definition contains four separate elements: 
(i) stubbornness; (ii) puzzlement; (iii) maintaining of the 
judgement; and (iv) the absence of supporting reasons. Of 
these individual elements, stubbornness and puzzlement, 
arguably, emerge as consequences of the combination 
of the maintenance of the judgement in the absence of 
supporting reasons. If a person maintains a judgement 
in the absence of reasons (and this absence of reasons 
has been pointed out to them) they will be perceived as 
stubborn; and, if a person becomes aware that they do 
not have reasons for their judgement, they may become 
puzzled.
Following this, and in line with the wider literature, the 
combination of elements (iii) and (iv), the maintenance of 
the judgement in the absence of supporting reasons are 
identified as essential elements of dumbfounding. This 
does not mean that stubbornness and puzzlement should 
be ignored entirely; accounting for them may be useful in 
differentiating between a failure to provide reasons and a 
refusal to provide reasons. However, viewing stubbornness 
and puzzlement as consequences of the maintenance of a 
judgement in the absence of supporting reasons, indicates 
that they are subsequent to, and not a necessary part of, 
moral dumbfounding.
This view of dumbfounding includes the elements of 
the phenomenon that are mentioned most frequently 
within the wider literature. It is also consistent with the 
way dumbfounding is described in the original study by 
Haidt et al. (2000). They report interesting variation in 
a number of non-verbal behaviours that may be linked 
with stubbornness or puzzlement, but beyond these, they 
do not offer a specific indication of how stubbornness 
and puzzlement are operationalised. Furthermore, 
other than appearing in the introductory definition for 
dumbfounding, in the abstract, (Haidt et al., 2000, p. 2), 
the terms “stubborn” and “puzzled” do not appear again 
for the remainder of the paper, suggesting that they are 
not core elements of the phenomenon.
Haidt et al. (2000) report a range of responses that may 
illustrate a state of dumbfoundedness (admissions of not 
having reasons and unsupported declarations), however, 
they do not provide details of the numbers of participants 
they classified as dumbfounded, or specific response that 
may be used to make such a classification. The numbers 
of participants who provided admissions of not having 
reasons are reported, however it is unclear whether or not 
this may be taken as a specific measure of dumbfounding 
or even if such a measure exists. This vagueness in the 
initial operationalisation of dumbfounding is reflected in 
the wider literature, whereby evidence of, or, illustrations 
of, dumbfounding include unsupported declarations 
(Haidt, 2001, p. 817; Prinz, 2005, p. 101), and tautological 
reasons (“because it’s incest”; Mallon & Nichols, 2011, 
p. 285). The current research aims to identify specific 
measurable responses that may be used as indicators of 
dumbfounding.
Drawing on the work of Haidt et al. (2000) and the 
wider literature, the absence of supporting reasons 
appears to present in two distinct ways. Firstly, and non-
controversially, participants may become aware that they 
do not have reasons and acknowledge this (admissions 
of not having reasons). Secondly, participants may fail to 
provide reasons. Measuring this failure to provide reasons 
is more problematic; if a participant does not admit to 
not having reasons, they attempt to disguise their failure 
to identify reasons. The use of unsupported declarations 
or tautological reasons as justifications for a judgement 
may be identified as a failure to provide reasons. Stating 
“it’s just wrong” or “because it’s wrong” does not answer 
the question “do you have a reason for your judgement?” 
(Mallon & Nichols, 2011, p. 285).
(The Short) History of Moral Dumbfounding
The earliest evidence for moral dumbfounding emerged 
indirectly as a result of a study by Haidt, Koller, and 
Dias (1993). This was a cross-cultural study examining 
the variability of the moral judgements of participants 
depending on age, socio-economic status, and nationality 
(USA or Brazil). Participants were presented with a range 
of moral scenarios, some of which were offensive, but 
harmless; for example, cutting up a national flag (Brazil 
or USA, matched to sample) and using it to clean the 
bathroom; a family eating their dog after it was killed 
by a car; and, a brother and sister kissing each other on 
the mouth. When asked to justify their condemnation of 
certain actions, some participants (from both countries) 
used unsupported declarations as a reason; for example, 
“Because it’s wrong to eat your dog” or “Because you’re 
not supposed to cut up the flag” (Haidt et al., 1993, p. 632). 
This study was not a direct study of moral dumbfounding, 
rather it was investigating differences in the way people 
reason about moral scenarios. The use of unsupported 
declarations in response to some moral scenarios was 
noted among a range of responses (Haidt et al., 1993).
A later study by Haidt et al. (2000) directly investigated 
the phenomenon of moral dumbfounding. In their study 
two moral scenarios (Incest and Cannibal: see Appendix A) 
designed to elicit strong emotional reactions, but with no 
identifiable harmful consequences (emotional intuition 
scenarios), were contrasted against a traditional moral 
judgement scenario (Heinz) that involved balancing 
the interests of two people (reasoning scenario). They 
observed differences in responses between the two 
types of scenarios, participants were better at defending 
their judgement for the reasoning scenario than for the 
emotional intuition scenarios. It appeared that these 
emotional intuition scenarios could elicit dumbfounding 
as evidenced by significant increases in (a) admissions 
of having no reasons for a judgement, or (b) the use 
of unsupported declarations (“it’s just wrong”) as a 
justification for a judgement (Haidt et al., 2000, p. 12). 
Although interesting, that study (consisting of a final 
sample of thirty participants) has not been published in 
peer reviewed form and has not been replicated.2
The following year, Haidt and Hersh (2001) investigated 
differences between conservatives and liberals, across 
a range of responses to moral issues, and found that 
conservatives produced more dumbfounded type 
responses (e.g., stuttering, stating “I don’t know”, admitting 
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they could not explain their answers (Haidt & Hersh, 2001, 
p. 200)), than liberals when discussing particular issues. 
Although this study did not investigate dumbfounding 
directly, the findings indicate that there may be individual 
differences that drive moral judgements which have not 
yet been fully investigated.
The phenomenon of moral dumbfounding has been 
widely discussed in the moral psychology literature (e.g., 
Cushman, 2013; Cushman et al., 2010, 2006; Hauser et 
al., 2007; Prinz, 2005; Royzman et al., 2015), but there is 
limited available empirical information about the nature 
of moral dumbfounding and the reliability with which 
it can be elicited in everyday human behaviour. Some 
authors have argued that moral dumbfounding does 
not really exist (Gray et al., 2014; Jacoby, 1983; see also 
Royzman et al., 2015; Sneddon, 2007; Wielenberg, 2014).3 
The studies described in the present paper aim to replicate 
the initial interview study of Haidt et al. (2000), and to 
explore practicable methods for testing the phenomenon, 
and its variability, in larger sample sizes. This will allow 
for more detailed study of the phenomenon. A deeper 
understanding of dumbfounding will inform the 
continuing development of theories of moral judgement, 
furthering our understanding of the interactions between 
intuitions and reasoned judgements in the way in which 
people make moral evaluations.
Moral Dumbfounding and Moral Intuitions
Moral dumbfounding is used as supporting evidence for 
a range of “intuitionist” theories of moral judgement (e.g. 
Cushman et al., 2010; Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2005). According 
to these intuitionist theories, our moral judgements are 
grounded in an emotional or intuitive automatic response 
rather than slow deliberate reasoning (Cameron, Payne, & 
Doris, 2013; Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Cushman et 
al., 2010; Greene, 2008; Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2005). Two of 
the most influential such theories of moral judgement 
have been Haidt’s social intuitionist model (Haidt, 2001; 
Haidt, & Björklund, 2008) and Greene’s dual processes 
model (Greene, 2008, 2013; Greene, Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001). Haidt (2001) in his 
social intuitionist model likens the distinction between 
fast moral intuitions and slow moral reasoning to the 
distinction between fast and slow thinking that appears 
in dual systems theories of cognition (Chaiken, 1980; 
see also Chaiken, & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Haidt, 
2001; Kahneman, 2011; Zajonc, 1980). In introducing 
and defending this model, Haidt makes specific reference 
to one of the dumbfounding scenarios, and the findings 
from the unpublished manuscript relating to this dilemma 
(Haidt, 2001; see also Haidt, & Björklund, 2008; Haidt, & 
Hersh, 2001). Greene draws heavily on Haidt’s work in 
defending his dual-process model of moral judgement 
(Greene, 2008). In more recent years, Cushman (2013; 
Cushman et al., 2010) and Crockett (2013), building 
on the work of Haidt and Greene have continued the 
development intuitionist/dual-process theories of moral 
judgement (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Greene, 
2008; Haidt, 2001).
The current research, following from Cushman 
(2013) and Crockett (2013), takes moral intuitions as 
“model-free” (Crockett, 2013, p. 364; Cushman, 2013, 
p. 284) or habitual responses, emerging through a long 
history of reinforcement learning. According to this 
approach, consistent with other research on implicit 
learning (Barsalou, 2003, 2008, 2009; see also Berry, & 
Dienes, 1993; Evans, 2003; Reber, 1989; Sun, Slusarz, & 
Terry, 2005), the learning of a moral norm, leading to 
the emergence an associated moral intuition, can occur 
independently of the learning of the reasons for, or 
explicit rules surrounding the norm. Attributing moral 
judgements to intuitions in this way also means that moral 
reasoning does not necessarily cause moral judgements, 
rather, at least in some circumstances, reasoning is likely 
to occur post-hoc.
However, the claim that reasons for intuitions 
are learned independently of the intuition does not 
necessarily imply that there are no reasons for a given 
intuition. This leads to two difficulties in demonstrating 
this separation between intuitions and reasons for the 
intuition. Firstly, in many circumstances, it is possible to 
trace the emergence of a given social or moral norm to 
particular reasons. Pizarro and Bloom (2003) defend the 
claim that moral intuitions may be rational, and informed 
by prior reasoning or deliberation. A related, more general 
claim is that deliberative (model-based) responses can, 
over time, become automatic or habitual (e.g., Barsalou, 
2003; Cushman, 2013; H. L. Dreyfus, & Dreyfus, 1990). 
Secondly, in many cases, after an intuitive judgement is 
made, reasons that are consistent with the judgement 
may be identified through post-hoc rationalisation (e.g., 
Cushman et al., 2006). This means that, although there is 
a clear theoretical case for a separation between intuitions 
and reasons for these intuitions, demonstrating this 
separation is problematic.
Moral dumbfounding, however, is a phenomenon 
that may demonstrate this separation between an 
intuition and reasons for the intuition. In certain cases, 
people maintain an intuitions even though they cannot 
provide reasons for the intuitions. It is this standing, 
as a rare demonstration of a crucial theoretical point, 
that makes moral dumbfounding so interesting. Moral 
dumbfounding therefore, provides evidence in support of 
the claim that moral intuitions are habitual and “model-
free” (Crockett, 2013, p. 364; Cushman, 2013, p. 284). 
Demonstrating this separation between intuitions and 
reasons for the intuitions also demonstrates a separation 
between intuitions and the reasoning process, providing 
evidence for the suggestion that moral judgements are 
not necessarily dependent upon moral reasoning and 
by extension, providing implicit evidence that moral 
reasoning occurs post-hoc.
The existence of moral dumbfounding, therefore, is 
compelling evidence for intuitionist theories of moral 
judgement. These theories are supported by a large body 
of other empirical evidence, however, they are also either 
directly (e.g., Cushman et al., 2010; Haidt, 2001; Hauser 
et al., 2008; Prinz, 2005) or indirectly (e.g., Crockett, 
2013; Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2008, 2013) grounded 
in the assumption that moral dumbfounding is a real 
phenomenon. The present research aims, to test the 
validity of the claim that moral dumbfounding is a real 
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phenomenon through an attempted replication of the 
widely-cited unpublished study by Haidt et al. (2000). 
This will also test the strength of existing moral theories 
grounded in its existence. In addition to this, we aim to 
identify specific, measurable indicators of dumbfounding 
and develop practicable methods for eliciting and 
measuring dumbfounding in larger samples. These may 
be used to explore the phenomenon in greater depth, 
informing the further development of moral theory.
Challenges to Moral Dumbfounding
In recent years moral dumbfounding has been challenged 
by a number of authors (e.g., Gray et al., 2014; Jacobson, 
2012; Sneddon, 2007; Wielenberg, 2014), arguing, in line 
with rationalist theories of moral judgement (Kohlberg, 
1971; Narvaez, 2005; Topolski, Weaver, Martin, & McCoy, 
2013), that moral judgements are grounded in reasons. 
Recent work by Royzman, Kim, and Leeman (2015), 
involving a series of studies focusing on the Incest 
dilemma, identified two reasons that may be guiding 
participants’ judgements. The reasons identified were: (a) 
potential harm – where participants believed that harm 
could arise as a result of the actions of the characters in the 
scenario despite the vignette stating that no harm arose; 
and (b) normativity – where citing a moral norm is seen as 
sufficient justification for making a judgement consistent 
with that norm. They found, that, when participants who 
endorsed either of these reasons were excluded from 
analysis, there were only four participants (from a sample 
of fifty-three) who rated the behaviour as wrong without 
offering a reason. Following a subsequent interview, two 
of these participants changed their judgement, and one 
changed her response to the question relating to normative 
reasons. This left just one participant who maintained 
that the behaviour was wrong without valid reason and, 
in their view, could be truly identified as dumbfounded. 
Consequently, they argue that dumbfounding is not as 
prevalent a phenomenon as portrayed by (Haidt et al. 
2000; Royzman et al., 2015, p. 310). In identifying reasons 
that appear to be guiding people’s judgements, they claim 
to have found evidence for rationalist theories of moral 
judgement (Royzman et al., 2015, p. 311) over intuitionist 
theories. They argue that the dumbfounded behaviours 
observed by Haidt et al. (2000) can be attributed to social 
pressure that exists in an interview setting, whereby 
participants accept the counter-arguments offered by 
the interviewer, even if they disagree, in order to appear 
cooperative (Royzman et al., 2015, p. 299).
Royzman et al. (2015) successfully identified reasons 
(harm-based reasons; normative reasons) that may underlie 
moral judgements in the case of the Incest dilemma, 
showing that, in the vast majority of cases, participants who 
rate the behaviour as wrong also endorse these reasons if 
given the opportunity. It is not surprising that instances 
of moral dumbfounding – defined as the maintaining a 
moral judgement without providing supporting reasons 
– can be dramatically reduced by providing participants 
with reasons for them to endorse (particularly in view of 
the extensive literature on confabulation, e.g., Evans, & 
Wason, 1976; Gazzaniga, & LeDoux, 2013; Johansson, Hall, 
Sikström, & Olsson, 2005; Nisbett, & Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 
& Bar-Anan, 2008). If a participant endorses a reason that 
is consistent with their judgement this does necessarily 
not mean that this reason contributed to the making of 
the judgement. Whether or not participants are able to 
articulate or volunteer these reasons, without external 
prompts, has not been the subject of careful empirical 
investigation. The degree to which people falsely attribute 
every-day judgements to reasons, that are more accurately 
described as post-hoc rationalisations, is well documented 
(Greene, 2008; Johansson et al., 2005; Nisbett, & Wilson, 
1977).
The inability of people to articulate principles that are 
consistent with, and therefore may arguably be guiding 
moral judgements has been documented in a study by 
Cushman et al. (2006). They identified three distinct 
principles that appear to guide moral judgements; these 
are: (a) harm caused by action is worse than harm caused 
by omission; (b) harm intended is worse than harm 
foreseen; (c) harm involving physical contact is worse than 
harm without physical contact. They conducted a series 
of studies in which participants’ judgements were largely 
consistent with these principles. Interestingly, however, 
when questioned afterwards, participants were only 
reliably able to articulate two of these principles (a) and (c). 
Principle (b), while consistent with the judgements made, 
was not well articulated by participants. It appears that, 
making judgements consistent with a principle does not 
imply that participants can articulate this principle. It is 
this inability to articulate principles or reasons for a moral 
judgement that is the hallmark of moral dumbfounding 
and is of key interest in the current research.
The Current Research
In response to the limited number of demonstrations of, 
and related uncertainty surrounding moral dumbfounding, 
the primary aims of the current research are to (a) identify 
specific measurable indicators of moral dumbfounding; 
and (b) use these measures to examine the reliability 
with which dumbfounded responding can be evoked. 
We conducted four studies, each of which is a modified 
replication attempt of the original moral dumbfounding 
study (Haidt et al., 2000). In these studies, dumbfounding 
is measured according to two sets of responses: (a) 
an admission of having no reasons for a judgement 
(a measure of self-reported dumbfounding) and, (b) 
use of unsupported declarations (“it’s just wrong”) or 
tautological reasons (“because it’s incest”) as a justification 
for a judgement (measures of a failure to provide reasons). 
Study 1 was designed to replicate Haidt et al.’s (2000) initial 
study using the original methods (face to face interview). 
In Study 2 we piloted alternative methods (a computer-
based task) in an attempt to evoke moral dumbfounding 
in a systematic way with a larger sample. In Study 3a 
and 3b the materials that were piloted in Study 2 were 
refined and administered to a larger sample in an attempt 
to systematically evoke dumbfounded responding. 
 
Study 1: Interview
The primary aim of Study 1 was to replicate the original 
dumbfounding study (Haidt et al., 2000). Four moral 
judgement vignettes were used (Appendix A). Three of 
McHugh et al: Searching for Moral Dumbfounding Art. 23, page 5 of 24
these vignettes (Heinz, Incest, and Cannibal) were taken 
from Haidt et al. (2000). A fourth vignette (Trolley) was 
adapted from Greene et al. (2001). Haidt et al. (2000) 
contrasted Heinz, a so-called reasoning scenario, against 
Cannibal and Incest, so-called intuition scenarios. Their 
study also included two tasks that did not have any moral 
content. For the purposes of consistency and balance, the 
non-moral tasks were omitted from the present study, and 
a second moral reasoning vignette was included in their 
stead, such that two reasoning vignettes (Heinz and Trolley) 
were contrasted against two intuition vignettes (Incest and 
Cannibal). We hypothesised that dumbfounding would 
be elicited and that rates of dumbfounded responding 
would vary depending on the content of the dilemma, 
with the intuition scenarios eliciting more dumbfounded 
responses than the reasoning scenarios. Two measures of 
dumbfounding were taken reflecting the two distinct ways 
in which absence of reasons may present: admissions of 
not having reasons (self-reported dumbfounding), and the 
use of an unsupported declaration (it’s just wrong) as a 
justification for a judgement, with a failure to provide any 
alternative reason when the unsupported declaration was 
questioned (a failure to provide reasons). As in the original 
study (Haidt et al., 2000), various non-verbal measures were 
also recorded in an attempt to account for stubbornness 
and puzzlement.
Method
Participants and design. Study 1 was a frequency 
based attempted replication. The aim was to identify 
if dumbfounded responding could be evoked. All 
participants were presented with the same four moral 
vignettes. Results are primarily descriptive. Any further 
analysis tested for differences in responding depending 
on the vignette, or type of vignette, presented.
A sample of 31 participants (15 female, 16 male) with a 
mean age of Mage = 28.83 (min = 19, max = 64, SD = 10.99) 
took part in this study. Participants were undergraduate 
students, postgraduate students, and alumni from Mary 
Immaculate College (MIC), and University of Limerick 
(UL). Participation was voluntary and participants were 
not reimbursed for their participation.
Procedure and materials. Four moral judgement 
vignettes were used (Appendix A). Three of the vignettes 
(Heinz, Incest, and Cannibal) were taken from Haidt et al. 
(2000). Incest was taken directly from the original study 
however Cannibal and Heinz were modified slightly, 
following piloting.
The original version of Cannibal stated that people had 
“donated their body to science for research”; participants 
during piloting were able to argue that eating does not 
constitute “research”. In order to remove this as a possible 
argument, the modified version stated that bodies had 
been donated for “the general use of the researchers 
in the lab” and that the “bodies are normally cremated, 
however, severed cuts may be disposed of at the discretion 
of lab researchers.”
Similarly, piloting suggested that participants agreed 
with the actions of Heinz and condemned the actions of 
the druggist. The original wording of Heinz suggested that 
any discussion related to Heinz as opposed to the druggist 
meaning that, for Heinz, participants would typically be 
defending an approval of the character’s actions. However, 
for Incest and Cannibal participants generally condemn 
the actions of the character and as such are defending 
a judgement of “morally wrong”. In order to ensure that 
participants were consistently defending a judgement of 
“morally wrong” across all scenarios, Heinz was modified 
to include “The druggist had Heinz arrested and charged”. 
Any discussion on Heinz then related to the character 
whose behaviour participants thought was wrong.
In the original study by Haidt et al. (2000), Incest 
and Cannibal are presented as “intuition” stories, and 
contrasted against a single “reasoning” dilemma: Heinz. In 
order for a more balanced comparison, a bridge variant 
of the classic trolley dilemma (Trolley) was included as a 
second “reasoning” dilemma. In this vignette, participants 
judge the actions of Paul, who pushes a large man off a 
bridge to stop a trolley and save five lives. The inclusion of 
Trolley meant that there were two “reasoning” dilemmas 
to be contrasted with the two “intuition” stories.
Sample counter-arguments were prepared for each 
scenario. To ensure that participants were only pushed 
to defend a judgement of “morally wrong” these 
counter-arguments exclusively defended the potentially 
questionable behaviour of the characters. A list of 
prepared counter-arguments can be seen in Appendix B. 
A post-discussion questionnaire, taken from Haidt et al. 
(2000) was administered after discussion of each scenario 
(Appendix C).
Two other measures were also taken for exploratory 
purposes. Firstly, in response to a possible link between 
meaning and morality (e.g., Bellin, 2012; Schnell, 2011), 
the Meaning in Life questionnaire (MLQ; Steger, Kashdan, 
Sullivan, & Lorentz, 2008) was included. This ten item 
scale, is made up of two five item sub scales: presence 
(e.g., “I understand my life’s meaning”) and search (e.g., 
“I am looking for something that makes my life feel 
meaningful”). Responses were recorded using a seven 
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 
7 (strongly agree). Secondly, in line with Haidt’s (2007; 
see also, Haidt, & Hersh, 2001) work, describing a link 
between religious conservatism and moral views, it was 
hypothesised that incidences of dumbfounding may be 
moderated by individual differences in religiosity. As such, 
the seven item CRSi7 scale, taken from The Centrality 
of Religiosity Scale (S. Huber & Huber, 2012) was also 
included. Participants responded to questions relating 
to the frequency with which they engage in religious or 
spiritual activity (e.g., “How often do you think about 
religious issues?”). Responses were recorded using a five 
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (very often).
The interviews took place in a designated psychology 
lab in MIC and were recorded on a digital video recording 
device. Participants were presented with an information 
sheet and a consent form. The consent form required two 
signatures: firstly, participants consented to take part in the 
study (including consent to be video recorded); the second 
signature related to use of the video for any presentation 
of the research (with voice distorted and face pixelated). 
Only two participants opted not to sign the second part.
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Participants read brief vignettes describing each 
scenario, and were subsequently interviewed regarding 
the protagonists. All four scenarios were discussed in a 
single interview session, with a brief pause between each 
discussion for the participant to complete a questionnaire 
about their judgements, and to read the next scenario. The 
conversation continued when they were happy to do so. 
Each of the four moral dilemmas Heinz, Trolley, Cannibal 
and Incest (Appendix A) were presented in this way and 
participants asked to judge the behaviour of the characters 
in the dilemmas. The order of presenting the scenarios 
was randomised. Judgements made by participants were 
challenged by the experimenter (“Nobody was harmed, 
how can there be anything wrong?”; “Do you still think 
it was wrong? Why?”; “Why do you think it is wrong?”; 
“Have you got a reason for your judgement?”). The 
resulting discussion continued until participants could 
not articulate any further arguments. Participants filled 
in a brief questionnaire after discussing each dilemma. In 
this they were asked to rate on a seven point Likert scale 
how right/wrong they thought the behaviour was; how 
confident they were in their judgement, how confused 
they were; how irritated they were; how much their 
judgement had changed; how much their judgement 
was based on reason; and how much their judgement 
was based on ‘gut’ feeling. Participants completed a 
longer questionnaire at the end of the interview. This 
contained the MLQ (Steger et al., 2008), the Centrality 
of Religiosity Scale (S. Huber & Huber, 2012), and some 
questions relating to demographics The entire study 
lasted approximately 20 to 25 minutes. The videos were 
analysed using BORIS – Behavioural Observation Research 
Interactive Software (Friard & Gamba, 2015). All statistical 
analysis was conducted using R (3.4.0, R Core Team, 
2017b)4; SPSS (IBM Corp, 2015) was also used.
Results and Discussion
The videos of the interviews were analysed and participants 
were identified as dumbfounded if they (a) admitted to 
not having reasons for their judgements; or (b) resorted 
to using unsupported declarations (“It’s just wrong!”) as 
justification for their judgements, and subsequently failed 
to provide reasons when questioned further. Table 1 
shows the initial and revised ratings of the behaviours for 
each scenario.
Twenty two of the 31 participants (70.97%) produced a 
dumbfounded response (admission of having no reasons; 
or the use of an unsupported declaration as a justification 
for a judgement, with a failure to provide any alternative 
reason when the unsupported declaration was questioned) 
at least once. Examples of such responses included “It just 
seems wrong and I cannot explain why, I don’t know”, 
“because I just think it’s wrong, oh God, I don’t know why, 
it’s just [pause] wrong”. Table 2 shows the number, and 
percentage, of participants who displayed dumbfounded 
responses and non-dumbfounded responses for each 
Table 1: Ratings of each scenario for each study.
 Heinz Cannibal Incest Trolley
Study Judgement  N percent  N percent N percent N percent
Study 1 Initial: Wrong  27  87.10%  25 80.65%  26 83.87%  23 74.19%
Initial: Neutral  0  0%  0  0%  0  0%  0  0%
Initial: OK  4  12.90%  6 19.35%  5 16.13%  8 25.81%
Revised: Wrong  26 83.87%  23 74.19%  20 64.52%  22 70.97%
Revised: Neutral  0  0%  0  0%  0  0%  1  3.23%
Revised: OK  5 16.13%  8 25.81%  11 35.48%  8 25.81%
Study 2 Initial: Wrong  53 73.61%  68 94.44%  63  87.5%  50 69.44%
Initial: Neutral  9  12.50%  3  4.17%  3  4.17%  6  8.33%
Initial: OK  10 13.89%  1  1.39%  6  8.33%  16 22.22%
Revised: Wrong  51 70.83%  67 93.06%  66 91.67%  48 66.67%
Revised: Neutral  7  9.72%  3  4.17%  3  4.17%  9  12.5%
Revised: OK  14 19.44%  2 2.78%  3  4.17%  15 20.83%
Study 3a Initial: Wrong  54  75%  67  93.06%  61  84.72%  48  66.67%
Initial: Neutral  6  8.33%  3  4.17%  7  9.72%  10 13.89%
Initial: OK  12  16.67%  2  2.78%  4  5.56%  14 19.44%
Revised: Wrong  53 73.61%  67 93.06%  57 79.17%  43 59.72%
Revised: Neutral  11 15.28%  4  5.56%  12 16.67%  15 20.83%
Revised: OK  8 11.11%  1  1.39%  3  4.17%  14 19.44%
Study 3b Initial: Wrong  81 80.20%  85 84.16%  71  70.3%  66 65.35%
Initial: Neutral  9  8.91%  13 12.87%  20  19.8%  14 13.86%
Initial: OK  11  10.89%  3  2.97%  10  9.9%  21 20.79%
Revised: Wrong  87 86.14%  82 81.19%  73 72.28%  59 58.42%
Revised: Neutral  10  9.9%  15 14.85%  19 18.81%  17 16.83%
Revised: OK  4  3.96%  4  3.96%  9  8.91%  25 24.75%
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Table 2: Observed frequency and percentage of each of the responses: dumbfounded, nothing wrong, and reasons 
provided.
  Heinz Cannibal Incest Trolley
  N percent N percent N percent N percent
Study 1  Nothing wrong  6  19.35%  8  25.81%  11  35.48%  8  25.81%
 Dumbfounded  0  0%  11  35.48%  18  58.06%  3  9.68%
 (admissions)  0  0%  8  25.81%  10  32.26%  3  9.68%
 (declarations)  0  0%  3  9.68%  8  25.81%  0  0%
 Reasons  25  80.65%  12  38.71%  2  6.45%  20  64.52%
Study 2  Nothing wrong  8  11.11%  4  5.56%  2  2.78%  10  13.89%
 Dumbfounded  45  62.5%  46  63.89%  54  75%  45  62.5%
 Reasons  19  26.39%  22  30.56%  16  22.22%  17  23.61%
Study 3a  Nothing wrong  14  19.44%  4  5.56%  12  16.67%  15  20.83%
(critical slide)  Dumbfounded  13  18.06%  14  19.44%  18  25%  14  19.44%
 Reasons  45  62.5%  54  75%  42  58.33%  43  59.72%
Study 3a  Nothing wrong  14  19.44%  4  5.56%  12  16.67%  15  20.83%
(coded)  Dumbfounded  19  26.39%  21  29.17%  31  43.06%  22  30.56%
 Reasons  39  54.17%  47  65.28%  29  40.28%  35  48.61%
Study 3b  Nothing wrong  21  20.79%  10  9.9%  31  30.69%  24  23.76%
(critical slide)  Dumbfounded  12  11.88%  19  18.81%  16  15.84%  16  15.84%
 Reasons  68  67.33%  72  71.29%  54  53.47%  61  60.4%
Study 3b  Nothing wrong  21  20.79%  10  9.9%  31  30.69%  24  23.76%
(coded)  Dumbfounded  16  15.84%  30  29.7%  28  27.72%  22  21.78%
 Reasons  64  63.37%  61  60.4%  42  41.58%  55  54.46%
Figure 1: Rates of observed dumbfounding for each  scenario across each study.
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dilemma. The rates of each type of dumbfounded response 
are also displayed. Figure 1 shows the percentage of 
participants displaying dumbfounded responses for 
each dilemma. Table 3 shows the responses to the 
questionnaires presented between dilemmas.
In line with the original study (Haidt et al., 2000), the 
videos were also coded by the primary researcher across a 
range of measures. Haidt et al. (2000) report differences, 
between intuition and reasoning scenarios. They do 
not, however, report comparisons between participants 
identified as dumbfounded and participants not identified 
as dumbfounded. The current research, aiming to identify 
measurable indicators of dumbfounding, categorised 
participants as dumbfounded according to the two 
types of verbal responses (admissions and unsupported 
declaration) and compared these groups with participants 
who were not identified as dumbfounded, across a range 
of measures. There were two stages in this analysis. 
Firstly, all participants identified as dumbfounded were 
compared against participants who provided reasons only. 
Secondly, participants identified as dumbfounded were 
grouped according to type of dumbfounded response, 
and participants who did not rate the behaviour as wrong 
were also included in the analysis.
Judgement variables reported by Haidt et al. (2000) 
included the length of time until the first argument, the 
length of time until the first evaluation, the length of time 
between the first evaluation and the first argument. The 
current research reports the same judgement variables.
A range of “argument variables” were also reported. 
Identifying specific objectively verifiable measurable 
indicators for some of the “argument variables” reported 
by Haidt et al. (2000) was problematic (e.g., “dead-ends”, 
“argument kept”, “argument dropped”). The current 
research coded each verbal utterance according to 
relevance for forming an argument. As such some of the 
argument variables reported by Haidt et al. (2000) are not 
reported here in the same way, however, related measures 
are reported.
Paralinguistic variables reported by Haidt et al. (2000) 
include frequency (per minute) of: “ums, uhs, hmms”, 
“turns with laughter”, “turns with face touch”, “doubt 
faces”, and “turns with pen fiddle”. As with the argument 
variables, the coding of the non-verbal/paralinguistic 
responses also varies slightly from what was reported by 
Haidt et al. (2000). We coded for both verbal hesitations 
(“um/em/uh”) and non-verbal hesitations/stuttering. 
“Turns” was coded independently of other behaviours as 
changing position. Laughter was coded for independently 
of changing position. The coding of hands touching 
the self was not limited to the face. Participants did not 
have pens to fiddle with, however we coded for generic 
fidgeting. The term “doubt faces” presented as problematic 
to code for rigorously across different individuals. As such, 
Table 3: Responses to post-discussion questionnaire questions.
Study Question Heinz Cannibal Incest Trolley
Study 1 Changed mind  2.87  3.40  2.63  2.60
Confidence  5.30  4.77  5.40  5.07
Confused  3.00  3.67  3.33  3.70
Irritated  3.00  3.33  3.13  3.37
‘Gut’  5.23  5.20  4.97  5.07
‘Reason’  4.83  4.40  4.43  4.77
Gut minus Reason  0.40  0.80  0.53  0.30
Study 2 Confidence  6.10  5.86  5.62  5.26
Confused  2.40  3.08  4.14  3.17
Irritated  4.58  4.68  4.32  4.28
‘Gut’  5.29  5.54  5.82  4.96
‘Reason’  4.89  5.19  4.89  4.93
Gut minus Reason  0.40  0.35  0.93  0.03
Study 3a Changed mind  2.38  1.67  2.00  2.00
Confidence  5.22  5.50  5.38  4.81
Confused  2.75  2.96  3.25  2.89
Irritated  3.94  4.64  4.07  3.60
‘Gut’  4.78  5.44  5.44  4.92
‘Reason’  5.07  5.26  5.11  5.06
Gut minus Reason  –0.29  0.18  0.33  –0.14
Study 3b Changed mind  1.74  1.60  1.57  1.83
Confidence  5.78  6.16  5.81  5.36
Confused  2.06  2.07  2.12  2.22
Irritated  4.42  4.01  3.56  3.39
‘Gut’  4.42  4.43  4.47  4.01
 ‘Reason’  5.46  5.69  5.26  5.58
 Gut minus Reason  –1.04  –1.27  –0.79  –1.57
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two distinctive and opposing facial expressions were 
coded for: smiling and frowning.
Dumbfounded versus reasons. Fifty nine cases of 
participants providing reasons, were compared with 32 
cases of dumbfounded responding. There was no difference 
in time until first judgement between the dumbfounded 
group, (M = 14.89, SD = 20.41) and the group who provided 
reasons (M = 15.19, SD = 40.54), p = .969. Similarly, there 
was no difference in time until first argument between 
the dumbfounded group, (M = 39.20, SD = 28.90) and 
the group who provided reasons (M = 30.49, SD = 32.30), 
F (1, 81) = 1.42, p = .237, partial η2 = .017. There was no 
difference in time from first judgement to time of first 
argument between the dumbfounded group, (M = 20.60, 
SD = 36.76) and the group who provided reasons 
(M = 15.65, SD = 46.42), p = .634.
There was a significant difference in frequency (per 
minute) of utterances whereby participants were working 
towards a reason between the dumbfounded group, 
(M = 1.47, SD = 1.45) and the group who provided reasons 
(M = 2.70, SD = 1.53), F (1, 89) = 13.82, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .134. There was no difference in frequency 
(per minute) of irrelevant arguments between the 
dumbfounded group, (M = 1.03, SD = .74) and the group 
who provided reasons (M = .86, SD = .77), F (1, 89) = 1.05, 
p = .308, partial η2 = .012. There was a significant difference 
in frequency (per minute) of expressions of doubt 
between the dumbfounded group, (M = .63, SD = .65) 
and the group who provided reasons (M = .31, SD = .58), 
F (1, 89) = 5.87, p = .017, partial η2 = .062.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference 
in number of times per minute participants laughed 
between the dumbfounded group, (M = 2.81, SD = 2.84) 
and the group who provided reasons (M = 1.18, SD = 1.25), 
F (1, 89) = 14.35, p < .001, partial η2 = .139. Similarly, 
a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
relative amount of time spent smiling (as a proportion of 
the total time spent on the given scenario) between the 
dumbfounded group, (M = .32, SD = .15) and the group 
who provided reasons (M = .16, SD = .14), F (1, 89) = 25.24, 
p < .001, partial η2 = .221. Consistent with the results 
reported by Haidt et al. (2000), a series of one-way ANOVAs 
revealed no differences in verbal hesitations, F (1, 89) = 2.35, 
p = .129, partial η2 = .026, non-verbal hesitations, p = .074, 
changing posture, p = .485, hands on the self, p = .864, 
frowning, p = .958, and fidgeting, F (1, 89) = 1.66, p = .201, 
partial  η2 = .018. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference relative amount of time spent in silence (as a 
proportion of the total time spent on the given scenario) 
between the dumbfounded group, (M = .14, SD = .08) 
and the group who provided reasons (M = .09, SD = .06), 
F (1, 89) = 9.72, p = .002, partial η2 = .098.
From the above analysis, it appears that, working towards 
reasons, expressions of doubt, laughter, smiling, and silence 
were the only measures that varied significantly depending 
on whether a person was identified as dumbfounded or 
provided reasons. Having identified differences between 
dumbfounded participants and participants providing 
reasons, the following analysis investigates if there are 
differences depending the type of dumbfounded response 
provided. participants who did not rate the behaviour as 
wrong are also included in the following analysis.
Variation between different types of dumbfounded 
responses. Four groups, based on overall reaction to 
scenarios, were identified: participants who did not rate the 
behaviour as wrong, participants who provided reasons, 
participants who provided unsupported declarations, and 
participants who admitted to not having reasons.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
relative frequency of utterances whereby participants 
were working towards a reason depending on overall 
reaction to scenarios, F (3, 120) = 7.54, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .159. Tukey’s post-hoc pairwise comparison revealed 
that participants who provided reasons were identified as 
working towards a reason significantly more frequently 
(M = 2.70, SD = 1.53) than participants who did not rate 
the behaviour as wrong (M = 1.76, SD = 1.48), p = .021, 
and more frequently than participants who provided 
unsupported declarations as justifications (M = .64, 
SD = .72), p < .001. There was no difference between 
participants who admitted to not having reasons (M = 1.90, 
SD = 1.56) and any of the other groups. A one-way ANOVA 
revealed no significant difference in relative frequency 
of expressions of doubt depending on overall reaction to 
scenarios, F (3, 120) = 2.17, p = .096, partial η2 = .051.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
relative frequency laughter depending on overall reaction 
to scenarios, F (3, 120) = 8.27, p < .001, partial η2 = .171. 
Tukey’s post-hoc pairwise comparison revealed that 
participants who admitted to not having reasons laughed 
significantly more frequently (M = 2.41, SD = 2.00), than 
participants who provided reasons (M = 1.18, SD = 1.25), 
p = .039, and more frequently than participants who 
provided did not rate the behaviour as wrong (M = .97, 
SD = 1.29), p = .025. Similarly, participants who provided 
unsupported declarations laughed significantly more 
frequently (M = 3.57, SD = 4.00), than participants who 
provided reasons, p < .001, and more frequently than 
participants who did not rate the behaviour as wrong, 
p < .001. There was no difference between participants 
who provided reasons, and participants who did not 
rate the behaviour as wrong p = .951. Interestingly, there 
was no difference between participants who admitted 
to not having reasons and participants who provided 
unsupported declarations, p = .305.
A similar pattern of results was found for time spent 
smiling. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant 
difference in relative time spent smiling depending on 
overall reaction to scenarios, F (3, 120) = 9.97, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .200. Tukey’s post-hoc pairwise comparison 
revealed that participants who admitted to not having 
reasons spent significantly more time smiling (M = .33, 
SD = .14), than participants who provided reasons (M = .16, 
SD = .14), p < .001, and more time smiling than participants 
who provided did not rate the behaviour as wrong (M = .16, 
SD = .13), p < .001. Participants who provided unsupported 
declarations spent significantly more time smiling (M = .31, 
SD = .17), than participants who provided reasons, p = .008, 
and participants who did not rate the behaviour as wrong, 
p = .014. There was no difference between participants 
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who provided reasons, and participants who did not 
rate the behaviour as wrong, p = 1.000. Again, there 
was no difference between participants who admitted 
to not having reasons and participants who provided 
unsupported declarations, p = .996.
A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference in 
relative amount of time spent in silence depending on 
overall reaction to scenarios, F (3, 120) = 3.31, p = .023, 
partial η2 = .076. Mean proportion of interview time spent 
in silence are as follows: participants providing reasons, 
M = .09, SD = .06; participants not rating the behavior 
as wrong, M = .12, SD = .07; participants admitting to 
not having reasons, M = .14, SD = .09; and participants 
providing unsupported declarations, M = .14, SD = .05. 
Tukey’s post-hoc pairwise comparison did not reveal any 
significant differences between specific groups.
Further analyses. An exploratory analysis revealed 
no association between number of times dumbfounded 
and score on either measures from the MLQ: Presence, 
r (31) = 0.74, p = .466, or Search, r (31) = 1.38, p = .179, or 
the Centrality of Religiosity Scale r (31) = 0.35, p = .726. 
There was no difference in observed rates of dumbfounded 
responses depending on the order of scenario presentation, 
χ2(6, N = 124) = 4.01, p = .676. Rates of dumbfounded 
responses varied depending on which moral dilemma 
was being discussed, χ2(6, N = 124) = 46.82, p < .001. 
The highest rate of dumbfounding was recorded for 
Incest, with 18 of the 31 (58.06%) participants displaying 
dumbfounded responses. Eleven participants (35.48%) 
displayed dumbfounded responses for Cannibal and three 
participants (9.68%) displayed dumbfounded responses 
for Trolley. The lowest recorded rate of dumbfounded 
response was for the Heinz dilemma, with no participants 
resorting to unsupported declarations as justification or 
admitting to not having reasons for their judgement. This 
trend is generally consistent with that which emerged in 
the original study (with the exception of Trolley, which 
was not used in the original study). Furthermore, rates 
of dumbfounded responding varied depending on which 
type of moral scenario was being discussed. Heinz and 
Trolley, identified as reasoning scenarios, were contrasted 
against the intuition scenarios Incest and Cannibal. There 
was significantly more dumbfounded responding for the 
intuition scenarios (29 instances) than for the reasoning 
scenarios (3 instances), χ2(2, N = 124) = 38.17, p < .001.
The aim of Study 1 was to examine the replicability of 
moral dumbfounding as identified by Haidt et al. (2000), 
and identify specific measurable responses that may 
be indicative of dumbfounding. The overall pattern of 
responses, and pattern of inter-scenario variability in 
responding resembled that observed in the original study. 
As such, Study 1 successfully replicated the findings of the 
original moral dumbfounding study (Haidt et al., 2000). 
Participants were identified as dumbfounded according to 
two specific measures, admissions of having no reasons, and 
unsupported declarations followed by a failure to provide 
reasons when questioned further. Both of these responses 
were accompanied by similar increases in incidences 
of laughter, and time spent smiling, when compared 
to participants providing reasons, and participants not 
rating the behaviour as wrong. When taken together, 
these responses were also accompanied by more silence 
during the interview, when compared with participants 
who provided reasons. As such, it appears that identifying 
incidences of dumbfounding according to unsupported 
declarations or admissions of not having reasons largely 
capture dumbfounding as described by Haidt et al. (2000).
Study 1 provides evidence supporting the view that 
moral dumbfounding is a genuine phenomenon and can 
be elicited in an interview setting when participants are 
pressed to justify their judgements of particular moral 
scenarios. Two key limitations have been identified as 
a result of conducting studies in an interview setting. 
Firstly, conducting video-recorded interviews, and the 
accompanying analyses, is particularly labour intensive, 
which leads to a smaller sample size. The aims of the 
present research were to examine the replicability of 
dumbfounding, and to identify specific measurable 
indicators of dumbfounding. A sample size of thirty-one 
is not sufficient in fulfilling the first aim. Secondly, an 
interview setting introduces a social context that may 
influence the responses of participants, in that, participants 
may feel a social pressure to behave in a particular way 
(Royzman et al., 2015). Alternative methods are required 
to examine dumbfounding with a larger sample, and 
whether it still occurs in the absence of the social pressure 
that is present in an interview setting. Two responses 
have been identified as indicators of dumbfounding. The 
degree to which each of these responses can be elicited in 
a setting other than an interview is investigated in Studies 
2 and 3.
Study 2: Initial Computerised Task
Having successfully elicited dumbfounded responses 
in a video recorded interview with a small sample, the 
aim of Study 2 was to devise methods that might elicit 
dumbfounding in a systematic way, using standardized 
materials and procedure that can be administered 
without the need for an interviewer. This will eliminate 
participant-interviewer interaction as a source of possible 
variability, remove the social pressure associated with an 
interview setting, and enable the study to be conducted 
with a larger sample. It was hypothesised that presenting 
participants with the same dilemmas and counter-
arguments as in Study 1 as part of a computer task, as 
opposed to in an interview, would lead to a similar state 
of dumbfoundedness as found in Study 1. However, a 
major challenge to this alternative medium of conducting 
the study is identifying specific behavioural responses 
that are indicative of a state of dumbfoundedness that 
can be elicited and recorded. Without the benefit of 
an experimenter to guide the discussion, and a video 
recording that can be analysed, this challenge was 
addressed by developing a critical slide (described below). 
Scenarios and counter-arguments to commonly made 
judgements were presented on a sequence of slides before 
participants were asked to describe their judgement on a 
forced choice critical slide. Participants were identified as 
dumbfounded if they selected an unsupported declaration 
from a selection of three possible responses present on 
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the critical slide, or if they provided an unsupported 
declaration as a reason.
Method
Participants and design. Study 2 was a frequency-
based, conceptual replication of Study 1. The aim was to 
identify if dumbfounded responding could be evoked via 
a computer-based task. All participants were presented 
with the same four moral vignettes. Results are primarily 
descriptive. Further analysis tested for differences in 
responding depending on the vignette, or type of vignette, 
presented.
A sample of of 72 participants (52 female, 20 male; 
Mage = 21.18, min = 18, max = 50, SD = 5.18) took part 
in this study. Participants were undergraduate students 
and postgraduate students from MIC. Participation was 
voluntary and participants were not reimbursed for their 
participation.
Procedure and materials. This study used largely the 
same materials as in Study 1. The four vignettes from Study 
1 Heinz, Incest, Cannibal, and Trolley (Appendix A) along 
with the same prepared counter-arguments (Appendix B) 
were used. Dumbfounding was measured using the critical 
slide. The critical slide contained a statement defending 
the behaviour and a question as to how the behaviour 
could be wrong (e.g., “Julie and Mark’s behaviour did not 
harm anyone, how can there be anything wrong with what 
they did?”). There were three possible answer options: (a) 
“There is nothing wrong”; (b) an unsupported declaration, 
naming the specific behaviour described in the scenario 
(e.g., “Incest is just wrong”); and finally a judgement 
with accompanying justification (c) “It’s wrong and I 
can provide a valid reason”. The order of these response 
options was randomised. Participants who selected (c) 
were then prompted on a following slide to type a reason. 
The selecting of option (b), the unsupported declaration, 
was taken to be a dumbfounded response, as was the 
use of an unsupported declaration as a justification for 
option (c).
This study made use of the same post-discussion 
questionnaire as in Study 1 (Appendix C). This was 
administered after the critical slide for each scenario. 
There was a change to one of the questions on this 
post-discussion questionnaire: the question asking if 
participants had changed their judgements was changed 
from “how much did your judgement change?” with a 
seven point Likert scale response to “did your judgement 
change?” with a binary “yes/no” response option. Both 
MLQ (Steger et al., 2008) and CRSi7 taken from The 
Centrality of Religiosity Scale (S. Huber & Huber, 2012) 
were also used.
OpenSesame was used to present the vignettes and 
collect responses (Mathôt, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2012). The 
same four moral dilemmas (Appendix A) as in Study 1 were 
presented to participants (in randomized order). Following 
the presentation of each dilemma, participants were 
asked to judge, on a seven point Likert scale how right or 
wrong they would rate the behaviour of the characters in 
the given scenario. After making a judgement participants 
were then presented with a series of counter-arguments. 
Following these counter-arguments, participants were 
presented with the critical slide. Following the critical 
slide participants completed the same brief questionnaire 
as in Study 1 (between scenarios) in which they were asked 
to rate, on a seven point Likert scale, how right/wrong 
they thought the behaviour was; how confused they 
were; how irritated they were; how much their judgement 
had changed; how much their judgement was based on 
reason; and how much their judgement was based on ‘gut’ 
feeling. When participants had completed all questions 
relating to all four dilemmas they completed the same 
longer questionnaire as in Study 1 containing the MLQ 
(Steger et al., 2008), the Centrality of Religiosity Scale 
(S. Huber & Huber, 2012), and some questions relating 
to demographics. The entire study lasted approximately 
fifteen to twenty minutes.
Results and Discussion
Participants who selected the unsupported declaration 
on the critical slide were identified as dumbfounded. 
Table 1 shows the ratings of the behaviours across each 
scenario. Table 2 shows the number, and percentage, of 
participants who displayed “dumbfounded” responses 
(identified as the selecting of an unsupported declaration) 
and non-dumbfounded responses for each dilemma. 
Figure 1 shows the percentage of participants displaying 
dumbfounded responses for each dilemma. Table 3 
shows the responses to the questionnaires presented 
between dilemmas. The open-ended responses provided 
by participants who selected option (c) “It’s wrong 
and I can provide a valid reason” were analysed and 
coded, by the primary researcher, and unsupported 
declarations provided here were also identified as 
dumbfounded responses. Following this coding, one 
additional participant was identified as dumbfounded for 
Trolley. Sixty eight of the 72 participants (94%) selected 
the unsupported declaration at least once. There was 
no statistically significant difference in responses to 
the critical slide depending on the order of scenario 
presentation, χ2(6, N = 288) = 4.13, p = .659. There was 
no statistically significant difference in responses to the 
critical slide depending on scenario presented, χ2(6, N = 
288) = 9.00, p = .173. Rates of dumbfounded responding 
did not vary with type of moral scenario (100 instances for 
intuition scenarios, 90 instances for reasoning scenarios) 
being discussed, χ2(2, N = 288) = 6.58, p = .037. Forty five 
participants (62.50%) selected the unsupported for Heinz. 
Forty six participants (63.89%) selected (or provided) 
the unsupported declaration for Cannibal and Trolley. 
Fifty four participants (75%) selected the unsupported 
declaration for Incest. There was no association between 
number of times dumbfounded and score on either 
measure on the Meaning and Life questionnaire; Presence 
r (72) = –0.44, p = .662, or Search, r (72) = 1.12, p = .268, 
or the Centrality of Religiosity Scale r (72) = 1.24, p = .220.
The most striking result from this study was the 
willingness of participants to select the unsupported 
declaration in response to a challenge to their judgement. 
This is inconsistent with what was found in in both Study 1 
and in the original study by Haidt et al. (2000). In these 
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studies, participants did not readily offer an unsupported 
declaration as justification for their judgement, rather 
it was a last resort following extensive cross-examining. 
The exceptionally high rates of dumbfounding observed 
in Study 2 do not appear to be representative of the 
phenomenon more generally. There is, therefore, clearly a 
difference between offering an unsupported declaration 
as a justification for a judgement during an interview 
and selecting an unsupported declaration from a list of 
possible response options during a computerised task. 
It is possible that, during the interview, participants 
experienced a social pressure to successfully justify 
their judgement. This social pressure may also have 
made participants were more aware of the illegitimacy 
of using an unsupported declaration as a justification 
for their judgement. It is also possible that, seeing it 
written down as a possible answer legitimises selecting 
it as a justification for the judgement. The unsupported 
declaration does not provide an acceptable answer to 
the question on the critical slide, however, its presence 
in the list of possible response options may imply to 
participants that it is an acceptable answer, particularly 
if they do not put too much thought into it. By selecting 
the unsupported declaration participants can move 
quickly along to the next stage in the study without 
necessarily acknowledging any inconsistency in their 
reasoning, avoiding potentially dissonant cognitions 
(e.g., Case, Andrews, Johnson, & Allard, 2005; E. Harmon-
Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007; see also Heine, Proulx, & 
Vohs, 2006). Selecting the unsupported declaration may 
also allow the participant to proceed without expending 
effort trying to think of reasons for their judgement 
beyond the intuitive justifications that had already been 
de-bunked.
Rates of dumbfounded responding in Study 2 were 
higher than expected. Possible reasons for this could be 
(a) reduced social pressure to appear to have reasons for 
judgements; (b) a failure of participants to comprehend 
that the unsupported declaration does not provide a 
logically justifiable response to the question asked in 
the critical slide; (c) the apparent legitimising of the 
unsupported declaration by its inclusion in the list 
of possible response options; or (d) the selecting by 
participants of an “easy way out” option without thinking 
about it fully (through carelessness/laziness/eagerness 
to move on to a less taxing task). It appears that the 
selecting of unsupported declarations is not an accurate 
measure of dumbfounding. In Study 1, participants were 
only identified as dumbfounded based on the providing 
of an unsupported declaration if they subsequently 
failed to provide further reasons when the unsupported 
declaration was questioned. However, in some cases, 
participants who provided unsupported declarations were 
not identified as dumbfounded, based on subsequent 
responses. A follow up analysis of the interview data 
revealed that 23 participants provided an unsupported 
declaration and proceeded to provide reasons for at 
least one of their judgements; a further six participants 
provided an unsupported declaration and proceeded to 
revise their judgement at least once. A stricter measure 
of dumbfounding, one by which participants are required 
to explicitly acknowledge a state of dumbfoundedness 
is necessary to address the issues with the selecting of 
an unsupported declaration that may have led to the 
unusually high rates of dumbfounding observed in 
Study 2.
Study 3a: Revised Computerised Task – College 
sample
Study 3a was designed in response to the unexpectedly 
high rates of observed dumbfounding in Study 2. Four 
limitations of the use of the unsupported declaration 
selection as a measure of dumbfounding were identified. 
It was hypothesised that replacing the unsupported 
declaration with an explicit admission of not having 
reasons would address each of these limitations, 
and bring the option selection more in line with 
conversational logic, making participants less willing 
to casually select the dumbfounded response. Making 
participants explicitly acknowledge the absence of 
reasons for their judgement means that their selecting 
of a dumbfounded response cannot be attributed to a 
mere misunderstanding and thus, might provide a truer 
measure of dumbfounding.
Method
Participants and design. Study 3a was a frequency 
based, modified replication. The aim was to identify 
if dumbfounded responding could be evoked. All 
participants were presented with the same four moral 
vignettes. Results are primarily descriptive. Further 
analysis tested for differences in responding depending 
on the vignette, or type of vignette, presented.
A sample of 72 participants (46 female, 26 male; 
Mage = 21.80, min = 18, max = 46, SD = 3.91) took part 
in this study. Participants were undergraduate students 
and postgraduate students from MIC. Participation was 
voluntary and participants were not reimbursed for their 
participation.
Procedure and materials. The materials in this study 
were almost the same as in Study 2 with a change to the 
“dumbfounded” response option on the critical slide. 
Extra questions were included following each of the 
counter-arguments. On the critical slide, the unsupported 
declaration option was replaced with an admission of not 
having reasons (“It’s wrong but I can’t think of a reason”). 
Following each counter-argument, participants were 
asked if they (still) thought the behaviour was wrong, 
and if they had a reason for their judgement. There was 
also a revision to the question on the post-discussion 
questionnaire asking if participants had changed their 
judgements was changed: “did your judgement change?” 
with a binary “yes/no” response option reverted back to 
“how much did your judgement change?” with a seven 
point Likert scale response (as in Study 1). The same four 
dilemmas Heinz, Incest, Cannibal and Trolley (Appendix 
A) along with the same prepared counter-arguments 
(Appendix B) as in Study 2 were used in Study 3a. Both 
the MLQ (Steger et al., 2008); and CRSi7 (S. Huber & 
Huber, 2012) were also used. This study was conducted 
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in a designated psychology computer lab in MIC and was 
administered entirely on individual computers using 
OpenSesame (Mathôt et al., 2012).
Participants were seated, given instructions, and allowed 
to begin the computer task. The four vignettes from 
Study 1 Heinz, Incest, Cannibal and Trolley (Appendix A) 
along with the same pre-prepared counter-arguments 
(Appendix B) were used. Dumbfounding was measured 
using the critical slide. The updated critical slide contained 
a statement defending the behaviour and a question as 
to how the behaviour could be wrong (e.g., “Julie and 
Mark’s behaviour did not harm anyone, how can there be 
anything wrong with what they did?”) with three possible 
response options: (a) “There is nothing wrong”; (b) “It’s 
wrong, but I can’t think of a reason”; (c) “It’s wrong and 
I can provide a valid reason”. The order of these response 
options was randomised. Participants who selected (c) 
were required to provide a reason. The selecting of option 
(b), the admission of not having reasons, was taken to 
be a dumbfounded response. When participants had 
completed all questions relating to all four dilemmas they 
completed the same longer questionnaire as in Studies 1 
and 2 containing the MLQ (Steger et al., 2008), the 
Centrality of Religiosity Scale (S. Huber & Huber, 2012), 
and some questions relating to demographics. The entire 
study lasted approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.
Results and Discussion
Participants who selected the admission of not having 
reasons on the critical slide (option b) were identified 
as dumbfounded. Forty of the 72 participants (56%) 
selected the admission of not having reasons at least 
once. Table 1 shows the ratings of the behaviours across 
each scenario. Table 2 and Figure 1 show the percentage 
of participants displaying dumbfounded responses 
for each dilemma. Table 3 shows the responses to the 
questionnaires presented between dilemmas. Again there 
was no statistically significant difference in responses 
to the critical slide depending on the order of scenario 
presentation, χ2(6, N = 288) = 0.61, p = .996. There was 
no difference in responses to the critical slide depending 
on scenario, χ2(6, N = 288) = 9.60, p = .142, or, type of 
scenario (32 instances for intuition scenarios, 27 instances 
for reasoning scenarios), χ2(2, N = 288) = 4.53, p = .104. 
Thirteen participants (18.06%) selected the admission 
of having no reasons for Heinz. Fourteen participants 
(19.44%) selected the admission of not having reasons for 
Cannibal and Trolley. Eighteen participants (25%) selected 
the admission of not having reasons for Incest.
The replacing of an unsupported declaration with an 
admission of having no reasons led to substantially lower 
rates of dumbfounding than observed in Study 2. As such, 
it appears that the issues associated with the selecting 
of an unsupported declaration have been addressed in 
Study 3a. However, the rates of dumbfounding observed 
for Incest and Cannibal in Study 3a were considerably 
lower than those observed in Study 1. This suggests the 
revised measure may be too strict, measuring only open 
admissions of not having reasons, but not accounting for a 
failure to provide reasons. As in the first computerised task, 
participants who selected “It’s wrong and I can provide a 
valid eason” were then required to provide a reason. In 
order to provide a measure of a failure to provide reasons, 
these responses were analysed and coded, by the primary 
researcher. Those containing unsupported declarations 
were taken as evidence for a failure to provide a reason 
and identified as dumbfounded responses.
During the coding, another class of dumbfounded 
response was identified. Participants occasionally provided 
undefended tautological responses as justification 
for their judgements, whereby they simply named or 
described the behaviour in the scenario as justification 
for their judgement (e.g., “They are related”, “Because 
it is cannibalism” [typographical error in response]). 
These responses may be viewed as largely equivalent to 
unsupported declarations (e.g., Mallon, & Nichols, 2011). 
In Study 1, they were not identified as dumbfounded 
responses, because when provided in an interview 
setting, they were always followed by further questioning. 
This further questioning could lead to two possible 
responses: (a) a dumbfounded response (unsupported 
declaration or an admission of not having reasons) or 
(b) an alternative reason. A computerised task does not 
allow for a follow-up probe to encourage participants to 
elaborate on such responses. Participants were not placed 
under time pressure and could articulate and review 
their typed reason at their own pace. It is reasonable to 
expect then, that, if participants did have a valid reason 
for their judgement, they would have provided it along 
with, or instead of, the undefended tautological response. 
As such, an undefended tautological reason appears to be 
evidence of a failure to identify reasons. For this reason, 
these undefended tautological reasons were also coded 
as dumbfounded responses, along with the unsupported 
declarations.
Table 2 and Figure 2 show the number and percentage 
of dumbfounded responses when the coded string 
responses are included in the analysis. When the coded 
string responses are included in the analysis, the number 
of participants displaying a dumbfounded response at 
least once increased from 40 (56%) to 57 (79%). Observed 
rates of dumbfounding increased for each scenario when 
the coded open-ended responses were included, with 19 
participants (26.39%) appearing to be dumbfounded by 
Heinz, 21 (29.17%) by Cannibal, 31 (43.06%) by Incest, 
and 22 (30.56%) apparently dumbfounded by Trolley. 
Still, rates of dumbfounded responding did not vary 
with type of moral scenario (52 instances for intuition 
scenarios, 41 instances for reasoning scenarios) being 
discussed, χ2(1, N = 288) = 1.59, p = .208. There was no 
association between number of times dumbfounded 
and score on either measure on the Meaning and Life 
questionnaire; Presence r (72) = 0.82, p = .413, or Search, 
r (72) = 0.07, p = .945, or the Centrality of Religiosity Scale 
r (72) = 1.29, p = .201.
When the coded open-ended responses were included 
in the analysis, the proportion of participants displaying 
a dumbfounded response at least once in Study 3a (79%) 
was much closer to that observed in the interview in 
Study 1 (74%) than before the open-ended responses 
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were included (56%). The variation in observed rates of 
dumbfounding between dilemmas that was observed 
in the interview was not present in the computerised 
task. As such there remains a difference between the 
dumbfounding elicited during an interview and that 
elicited as part of a computerised task. However, it is 
clear that dumbfounded responses can be elicited as part 
of a computerised task. The participants in Studies 1, 2, 
and 3a were all college students (largely from the same 
institution) and as such, the following study investigated 
the phenomenon in a more diverse sample.
Study 3b: Revised Computerised Task – MTurk
Having successfully elicited dumbfounded responses in 
a college sample using a computerised task in Study 3a, 
Study 3b was conducted in an attempt to replicate Study 
3a using more diverse sample using online recruiting 
through MTurk (Amazon Web Services Inc., 2016).
Method
Participants and design. Study 3b was a frequency 
based, modified replication. The aim was to identify 
if dumbfounded responding could be evoked. All 
participants were presented with the same four moral 
vignettes. Results are primarily descriptive. Further 
analysis tested for differences in responding depending 
on the vignette, or type of vignette, presented.
A sample of 101 participants (53 female, 47 male; Mage = 
36.58, min = 18, max = 69, SD = 12.45) took part in this 
study. Participants were recruited online through MTurk 
(Amazon Web Services Inc., 2016). Participation was 
voluntary and participants were paid 0.70 US dollars 
for their participation. Participants were recruited from 
English speaking countries or from countries where 
residents generally have a high level of English (e.g., 
The Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden). Location data for 
individual participants was not recorded, however, based 
on other studies, using the same selection criteria, it is 
likely that 90% of the sample was from the United States.
Procedure and materials. The materials in this study 
were almost the same as in Study 3a, however, a different 
software package was used to present the materials and 
collect the responses. OpenSesame (Mathôt et al., 2012) 
was replaced with Questback (Unipark, 2013) in order 
to facilitate online data collection. This meant that the 
recording of responses changed from keyboard input to 
mouse input. It also allowed for multiple questions to 
be displayed on the screen at the same time. Other than 
these changes, the materials were the same as in Study 3a.
The computer task in Study 3b was much the same 
as Study 3a. The four vignettes from Study 1: Heinz, 
Incest, Cannibal, and Trolley (Appendix A) along with 
the same pre-prepared counter-arguments (Appendix B). 
Dumbfounding was measured using the critical slide.
The critical slide contained a statement defending 
the behaviour and a question as to how the behaviour 
could be wrong, with three possible response options: 
(a) “There is nothing wrong”; (b) “It’s wrong but I can’t 
Figure 2: Rates of observed dumbfounding for each scenario across each study, including coded string responses.
McHugh et al: Searching for Moral Dumbfounding Art. 23, page 15 of 24
think of a reason”; (c) “It’s wrong and I can provide a 
valid reason”. Participants who selected (c) were required 
to provide a reason. The order of these response options 
was randomised. When participants had completed all 
questions relating to all four dilemmas they completed the 
same longer questionnaire as in Studies 1 and 2 containing 
the Meaning and Life questionnaire (Steger et al., 2008), 
the Centrality of Religiosity Scale (S. Huber & Huber, 2012), 
and some questions relating to demographics. The entire 
study lasted approximately fifteen to twenty minutes.
Results and Discussion
Participants who selected the admission of not having 
reasons on the critical slide (option b) were identified as 
dumbfounded. Table 1 shows the ratings of the behaviours 
across each scenario. Table 2 and Figure 1 show the 
percentage of participants displaying dumbfounded 
responses for each scenario. Table 3 shows the responses 
to the questionnaires presented between scenario. On this 
occasion there was a statistically significant difference in 
responses to the critical slide depending on the order of 
scenario presentation, χ2(6, N = 404) = 14.77, p = .022. The 
observed rates of dumbfounded responses were higher 
for the third scenario, however they went down again for 
the fourth scenario along with rates of selecting “nothing 
wrong”, meaning that the rates of participants providing 
reasons went up again for the fourth scenario. The higher 
rates of providing reasons observed for the fourth scenario 
presented means that this fluctuation is unlikely to be due 
to experimental fatigue, which was the primary reason 
for testing for order effects. There was also a difference 
in responses to the critical slide depending on scenario, 
χ2(6, N = 404) = 15.18, p = .019 with more people selecting 
“nothing wrong” for Incest and fewer people selecting 
“nothing wrong” for Cannibal. When dumbfounded 
responses are isolated and contrasted against other 
responses this difference is no longer present, χ2(3, 
N = 404) = 1.86, p = .602. Forty four participants (44%) 
selected the admission of not having reasons at least once. 
Twelve participants (11.88%) selected the admission of 
having no reasons for Heinz. Sixteen participants (15.84%) 
selected the admission of not having reasons for Incest 
and Trolley. Nineteen participants (18.81%) selected the 
admission of not having reasons for Cannibal.
As in Study 3a, participants who selected option 
(c) “It’s wrong and I can provide a valid reason”, were 
then required to provide a reason through open-ended 
response. These open-ended responses were coded, by the 
primary researcher, for dumbfounded responses, again, 
identified as unsupported declarations or as undefended 
tautological responses. Table 2 and Figure 2 show the 
rates of observed dumbfounding when the coded open-
ended responses were included in the analysis. As expected, 
the number of participants displaying a dumbfounded 
response at least once increased, from 44 (44%) to 57 
(56%). Observed rates of dumbfounding increased for 
each scenario when the coded reasons were included with 
16 participants (15.84%) appearing to be dumbfounded 
by Heinz, 30 (29.70%) by Cannibal, 28 (27.72%) by 
Incest, and 22 (21.78%) apparently dumbfounded by 
Trolley. Taking these revised rates of dumbfounding there 
was no significant difference in rates of dumbfounded 
responding depending on scenario, χ2(3, N = 404) 
= 6.56, p = .087. There was however, significantly more 
dumbfounded responding for the intuition scenarios (58 
instances) than for the reasoning scenarios (38 instances), 
χ2(1, N = 404) = 4.93, p = .026.
There was no association between number of times 
dumbfounded and score on either measure on the Meaning 
and Life questionnaire; Presence r (101) = –0.78, p = .436, 
or Search, r (101) = 0.63, p = .532, or the Centrality of 
Religiosity Scale r (101) = 0.44, p = .662. This is consistent 
with Studies 1, 2, and 3a. It appears that susceptibility to 
dumbfounding is not related to either measure.
Combined Results and Discussion
Evaluating each Measure of Dumbfounding
The current research identifies moral dumbfounding as 
a rare demonstration of a separation between intuitions 
and reasons for these intuitions (e.g., Barsalou, 2003, 
2008, 2009; Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013). Two ways in 
which this separation may manifest were identified. Firstly 
participants may acknowledge that they do not have 
reasons for their judgements, admitting to not having 
reasons. Secondly, participants may fail to provide reasons 
when asked, providing responses that fail to answer 
the question they were asked. Two such responses were 
identified, unsupported declarations and tautological 
responses.
Measuring dumbfounding according to an admission of 
not having reasons only, in Studies 1, 3a and 3b (N = 204), 
100 participants (49%) were identified as dumbfounded 
at least once. When a failure to provide reasons (taken 
as the providing of unsupported declarations in Study 1, 
and, unsupported declarations and tautological responses 
in Study 3) was included as a dumbfounded response, 
136 participants (67%) were identified as dumbfounded 
at least once. When the selecting of an unsupported 
declaration (Study 2, N = 72) was included (N = 276), 204 
participants, (74%) were identified as dumbfounded at 
least once.
The disparity in results between Study 2 and the other 
studies suggests that the selection of an unsupported 
declaration does not provide a good measure of moral 
dumbfounding. Participants in Studies 1, 3a, and 3b, 
recognised the illegitimacy unsupported declarations as 
justifications for their judgement, and the majority of 
participants avoided resorting to this type of response 
at all. The vast majority of participants appeared to be 
willing to ignore the illegitimacy of the response, with 
large numbers of participants selecting the unsupported 
declaration. While Study 2 did not identify a means to 
measure dumbfounding, these results are interesting, and 
may provide an insight into the cognitive processes that 
lead to dumbfounding.
Providing an unsupported declaration is clearly different 
to selecting one from a list of possible responses. One 
possible explanation, is that dumbfounding is an aversive 
state, similar to experiencing a threat to meaning (Heine et 
al., 2006; Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012), or cognitive dissonance 
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(Cooper, 2007; Festinger, 1957; E. Harmon-Jones, & 
Harmon-Jones, 2007). The selecting of an unsupported 
declaration without deliberation allows participants to 
avoid or minimise the impact of this aversive state and 
move on. Providing an unsupported declaration involves 
more deliberation, making the illegitimacy of it more 
salient, reducing its effectiveness in avoiding the aversive 
state of dumbfoundedness. Furthermore, the relative 
attractiveness of these different responses to participants 
may be linked to social desirability (Chung, & Monroe, 
2003; Latif, 2000; Morris, & McDonald, 2013). Follow-up 
work could investigate these questions directly.
The explicit acknowledgement of an absence of reasons 
can be measured systematically by the selection of an 
admission of having no reasons. This is an unambiguous 
measure of moral dumbfounding, does not account for 
participants who fail to provide reasons. Measuring a 
failure to provide reasons, however, is more problematic. 
What is termed as a valid reason is subjective. The 
providing of unsupported declarations and tautological 
responses has been identified here as an indicator of a 
failure to provide reasons. This is grounded in discussions 
of dumbfounding in the wider literature (Haidt, 2001; 
Mallon, & Nichols, 2011; Prinz, 2005), and the theoretical 
framework adopted here. Evidence for equivalence 
of unsupported declarations and admissions of not 
having reasons was also found in Study 1 whereby both 
measures displayed similar variability in non-verbal 
behaviours when contrasted against participants who 
provided reasons, and participants who did not rate the 
behaviour as wrong. However, caution is advised in taking 
unsupported declarations as evidence for dumbfounding, 
particularly given the pattern of responses in Study 2, and 
that a number of participants in Study 1 who provided an 
unsupported declaration proceeded to provide reasons, or 
a revised judgement.
The current research identified two measures of 
dumbfounding. Limitations are associated with each. 
Relying on admissions of having no reasons only, provides 
an overly strict measure whereby a failure to provide 
reasons is not measured. Taking unsupported declarations 
(and tautological reasons) as a measure of dumbfounding 
may provide too broad a measure, risks identifying 
lazy or inattentive participants as dumbfounded. 
The providing of a type-written response as part of a 
computerised task requires effort, and the majority of 
participants avoid the use of unsupported declarations 
as justifications for their judgements. This suggests 
that those who provided unsupported declarations did 
so because they failed to identify alternative reason. It 
appears that the most practicable means to measure 
dumbfounding accurately requires each of the responses: 
providing/selecting admissions of not having reasons, 
and the providing of an unsupported declaration, 
to be accounted for. Participants providing either of 
these responses may be identified as dumbfounded. 
 
Differences between Scenarios
In Study 1, we found that rates of dumbfounded 
responding varied depending on the scenario presented. 
Study 2 recorded high rates of dumbfounded responses for 
all scenarios. In Studies 3a and 3b, we observed low rates 
of dumbfounded responding for all scenarios. In Study 1 
and Study 3b, we observed varying rates of dumbfounded 
responses depending on scenario type. When Studies 3a 
and 3b are analysed together this variation is still observed, 
with significantly more dumbfounded responses recorded 
for the intuition scenarios (110 instances) than for the 
reasoning scenarios (79 instances), χ2(1, N = 288) = 6.55, 
p = .010. However, this combined analysis may be skewed 
in favour of Study 3b, due to the larger sample size, 101 
participants; Study 3a had only 72 participants. Further 
research and continued replication is needed to confirm 
the reliability of this finding. When the open-ended 
responses coded as tautological were included in the 
analysis of Studies 3a and 3b, the rates of dumbfounding 
appeared to be closer to those observed in Study 1.
Table 2 and Figure 1 show the initial observed rates of 
dumbfounding for each study. Table 2 and Figure 2 show 
the revised rates of observed dumbfound responding in 
each study once the open-ended coded responses from 
Studies 3a and 3b are included. Rates of dumbfounding 
reported by Haidt et al. (2000) are also included for 
comparison. Study 2 was a primarily a pilot study, and, 
as discussed, the observed rates of dumbfounding do not 
appear to be representative of the phenomenon being 
studied, as such Study 2 is not included in Figure 2.
Differences between the Samples
The trend in observed rates of dumbfounded responses, 
across the dilemmas, identified by Haidt et al. (2000) 
appears to also be present in Study 1 (Interview). There 
does not appear to be a difference between scenarios in 
the computerised tasks. When the open-ended responses 
are included, the rates of observed dumbfounding for 
Cannibal appear to be similar across all the studies included 
in Figure 2 (two interviews and two computerised tasks). 
The computerised tasks appear to have higher rates 
of dumbfounding for both Heinz and Trolley than the 
interviews. There is a large degree of variation in the 
observed rate of dumbfounding for Incest between the 
four studies.
Incest recorded higher rates of dumbfounding than 
the other scenarios in both interview studies (Study 
1 and Haidt et al., 2000) and, to some degree, in Study 
3a, the computer task with a college sample. The rate 
of dumbfounding observed for Incest with the online 
sample, in Study 3b, is lower than that observed with 
the college sample in Study 3a and is also slightly lower 
than that observed for Cannibal in the online sample. 
This is surprising, in that, the Incest dilemma is the most 
commonly cited example (e.g., Haidt, 2001; Prinz, 2005; 
Royzman et al., 2015), and, in Studies 1, 2, and 3a, is the 
most reliable for eliciting dumbfounding, consistently 
eliciting higher rates than the other dilemmas. Looking 
at the ratings of the behaviours in each dilemma for each 
study may provide some clue as to where this variation 
comes from. The online sample were less inclined to rate 
the behaviour in Incest as wrong relative to the participants 
in the other studies. The percentage of participants initially 
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rating Incest as wrong for each study are as follows: Study 
1: 83.87%; Study 2: 87.50%; Study 3a: 84.72%; Study 3b: 
70.30%. Furthermore, on the critical slide, the proportion 
of participants who selected “nothing wrong” for Incest for 
Study 3b (30.69%; 31 participants) was nearly double the 
proportion that selected “nothing wrong” for Incest for 
Study 3a (16.67; 12 participants). When these participants 
are excluded from the analysis of Study 3b (see Table 4 and 
Figure 3), the percentage of participants appearing to be 
dumbfounded by Incest (22.86%; 16 participants; or 40%; 
28 participants when open-ended responses are included; 
N = 70) exceeds the percentage of participants appearing 
to be dumbfounded by Cannibal (20.88%; 19 participants; 
or 32.97%; 30 participants when open-ended responses 
are included; N = 91). As such, it appears that the apparent 
uncharacteristically low rates of observed dumbfounding 
for Incest in Study 3b, when compared to Cannibal, may 
be due to the online sample being less inclined to rate 
the behaviour as morally wrong rather than a difference 
in this sample’s ability to provide justifications for their 
judgements to the two scenarios.
It has been argued that moral dumbfounding occurs as 
a result of social pressure to conform to conversational 
norms (Royzman et al., 2015). The findings presented 
by Royzman et al. (2015) do not fully support this claim, 
however, they demonstrate that incidences of moral 
dumbfounding are sensitive to social pressure. Studies 2 
and 3, aimed to reduce the influence of social pressure by 
testing dumbfounding as part of a computerised task, as 
opposed to in an interview setting. The varying rates of 
dumbfounding depending on task type indicate that the 
computerised task is different from the interview.
Table 4: Percentage of participants dumbfounded excluding participants who selected nothing wrong.
 Heinz Cannibal Incest Trolley
 N percent N percent N percent N percent
Study 1 (N = 31)  0/25  0%  11/23  47.83%  18/20  90%  3/23  13.04%
Study 2 (N = 72)  45/64  70.31%  46/68  67.65%  54/70  77.14%  46/62  74.19%
Study 3a (N = 72)  19/58  32.76%  21/68  30.88%  31/60  51.67%  22/57  38.6%
Study 3b (N = 101)  16/80  20%  30/91  32.97%  28/70  40%  22/77  28.57%
Figure 3: Percentage of dumbfounded responses when “nothing wrong” is excluded.
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Evidence that social pressure is reduced in the 
computerised task can be found by examining the degree 
to which participants changed their minds, as measured 
in the self-report response, and by comparing the initial 
judgements and revised judgements. The self-report 
responses for Study 2 were of a binary yes/no form, 
whereas the responses in the other studies were provided 
on a 1–7 Likert scale. As such the self-report data from 
Study 2 is not included in the analysis that follows.
The mean responses for the self-report question “How 
much did you change your mind?” are as follows: Study 1, 
M = 2.88, SD = 1.59; Study 3a, M = 2.01, SD = 1.46; Study 3b, 
M = 1.69, SD = 1.27. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant 
differences in responses to this question between the 
different studies, F (2, 809) = 33.81, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .077. Tukey’s post-hoc pairwise comparison revealed 
that responses in Study 1 were significantly higher than 
both Study 3a, p < .001, and Study 3b, p < .001. The 
responses in Study 3a were also significantly higher than 
the responses in Study 3b, p = .008.
The initial judgements and revised judgements in the 
computer tasks were binned for comparison with the 
interview. “Wrong” judgements were assigned a value of 
“–1”, “Right” judgements were assigned a value of “+1”, 
“neutral” judgements were assigned a value of 0. The 
values for the revised judgements were subtracted from 
values for the initial judgements to create a new variable 
containing positive values ranging from –2 to +2. Negative 
values represent a change in judgement towards a more 
favourable judgement, and positive values represent a 
change in judgement towards condemning the actions. 
Higher values represent a greater swing in judgement. 
In the interview, there was only one incidence of a 
participant changing their judgement from favourable 
to condemnation, whereas 11 participants changed their 
judgement towards a more favourable judgement. In the 
computerised tasks, the numbers of participants changing 
their judgement in each direction is more balanced (see 
Table 1). There was a significant association between 
type of study and whether or not participants changed 
their mind in a given direction, χ2(12, N = 1104) = 37.18, 
p < .001. When Study 1 was removed this association 
disappeared, χ2(8, N = 980) = 10.11, p = .258. This pattern 
of results suggests that participants reacted differently in 
the interview than in the computerised tasks.
General Discussion
The goal of this research was to examine the replicability 
of dumbfounded responding following a moral judgement 
task, and identify specific measurable responses that may 
be viewed as indicators of moral dumbfounding. Four 
studies, with a combined total sample of N = 276, were 
conducted in an attempt to replicate and extend the 
original demonstration (N = 30) of moral dumbfounding 
by Haidt et al. (2000). We predicted that dumbfounded 
responses would be evoked when participants were 
required to provide justification for their moral 
judgements, when their basic intuitive justifications had 
been refuted. Two measures of moral dumbfounding 
were taken, an explicit acknowledgement of the absence 
of reasons, and a failure to provide reasons when pushed. 
Rates of observed dumbfounding vary depending on 
which measure is being employed.
Intuition versus Reasoning
Haidt et al. (2000) attribute the observed trend in 
dumbfounded responding to differences in type of 
scenario. They argue that Heinz is a “reasoning” scenario 
while Cannibal and Incest are “intuition” scenarios. Prinz 
(2005) suggests that these “intuition” scenarios have 
an emotional component, specifically that they elicit 
disgust, which leads to the judgement. Prinz argues that 
judgements grounded in disgust are more difficult to 
justify because they are grounded in emotion rather than 
reason. The variability between scenarios may be evidence 
for the prediction by Haidt et al. (2000) that judgements 
on the “intuition” scenarios would be more difficult to 
justify than the “reasoning” scenarios.
Study 1, the interview, was the only study to produce 
robust differences between the scenarios.5 The results 
of the computerised tasks may indicate that there is 
no difference between the reasoning scenarios and 
the intuition scenarios. Alternatively, this may have 
highlighted a difference between an interview and a 
computerized task that influences the way people make 
moral judgements.
It is possible that there exists a social influence in an 
interview setting that changes the way participants 
respond (e.g., Asch, 1956; Sabini, 1995; Staub, 2013) 
and, that the interviewer may be seen as a person in 
authority, demanding justifications for judgements made 
(e.g., Milgram, 1974). This may motivate participants 
to identify reasons to justify their judgements, leading 
to the suppression of dumbfounded responses. On the 
other hand, it may also motivate participants to heed 
the counter-arguments offered by the experimenter. This 
may lead to an interaction between scenario difficulty 
and social pressure to emerge, with the social pressure 
leading to fewer dumbfounded responses to the easier 
“reasoning” scenarios, but leading to more dumbfounded 
responses to the more difficult “intuition” scenarios. It 
may be the case that the rates of dumbfounding found in 
the computer tasks provide something of a crude baseline 
measure of participants’ initial perception of their own 
ability to justify their judgement of the scenario, having 
read the scenario and a number of counter-arguments. In 
the interview, these initial responses to the scenarios are 
distilled by the discussion with the experimenter to reflect 
the variation in difficulty between the scenarios.
Implications
The existence of moral dumbfounding has informed 
various theories of moral judgement either directly (e.g., 
Cushman et al., 2010; Haidt, 2001; Hauser et al., 2008; 
Prinz, 2005) or indirectly (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; 
Greene, 2008, 2013). The original demonstration of moral 
dumbfounding remains unpublished in peer reviewed 
form (Haidt et al., 2000) and has not been directly 
replicated. The studies presented here aimed to replicate 
and extend this original moral dumbfounding study 
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(Haidt et al., 2000) and thus, assess the notion that moral 
dumbfounding is in fact a psychological phenomenon 
that can be consistently observed. Study 1 successfully 
replicated the original study. Study 2 piloted the use of 
a computer task and recorded unexpectedly high rates of 
dumbfounded responding. Possible reasons for this were 
identified and addressed in Studies 3a and 3b. Study 3a 
and 3b recorded more moderate rates of dumbfounding 
with two different samples. All three studies successfully 
elicited dumbfounded responding identified as (a) 
admissions of not having reasons; (b) use of unsupported 
declarations as justification of a judgement; or (c) use 
of undefended tautological response as justification for 
a judgement; however, differences remain between the 
interview in Study 1 and the computerised task in Studies 
3a and 3b. Taking these responses to be indicators of 
a state of dumbfoundedness, it appears that moral 
dumbfounding can be evoked in face-to-face and online 
contexts. As such, the research presented here may be 
seen as more support for the existence of intuitionist 
theories of moral judgement (e.g., Cushman et al., 2010; 
Greene, 2008; Haidt, 2001; Hauser et al., 2008; Prinz, 
2005) over rationalist theories (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; 
Topolski et al., 2013).
Responding to Criticisms
The present research did not directly address the questions 
raised by Royzman et al. (2015). Those researchers suggest 
that there are two main factors that lead participants 
to produce responses that appear to be indicative of 
dumbfounding. Firstly, they argue that dumbfounded 
responding occurs as a result of social pressure to avoid 
appearing “uncooperative” (Royzman et al., 2015, p. 
299), “inattentive” or “stubborn” (Royzman et al., 2015, 
p. 310). However, recall that the original definition of 
dumbfounding, which Royzman et al. employ, refers to 
the “stubborn” maintenance of a judgement. This creates a 
paradoxical situation whereby presenting as stubborn (as 
part of a dumbfounded response) occurs as a result of an 
attempt to avoid appearing stubborn. Secondly, they claim 
that participants’ judgements can be attributed to either 
norm-based reasons, or reason of potential harm. This 
claim is tested by presenting participants with questions 
relating to norm-based reasons and harm-based reasons, 
and excluding participants from analysis, based on their 
responses to these questions. They showed that almost 
all participants who rated the behaviour as wrong also 
endorsed at least one of these reasons. When controlling 
for the endorsing of these reasons Royzman et al. report 
a dumbfounding estimate of 1/53 which they report to 
be “not significantly greater than 0/53 (z = 1.00, p = .32)” 
(Royzman et al., 2015, p. 309) leading to the conclusion 
that, when controlling for norm-based reasons or harm-
based reasons, moral dumbfounding does not occur. 
There are three main issues with the way this conclusion 
is reached.
Firstly, the initial estimate of incidences of dumbfounding 
was 4/53 (7.55%). Based on the same calculations 
used by Royzman et al. (2015), this estimate of 4/53 is 
significantly greater than 0/53, z = 2.04, p = .041. These 
four participants were then interviewed further, during 
which, the “inconsistencies” in participants’ “responses 
were pointed out directly” (Royzman et al., 2015, p. 308). 
Following this interview, Royzman et al. were left with a 
dumbfounding estimate of 1/53 (which they claim is not 
significantly greater than 0/53).
It is surprising that, having made the claim that 
dumbfounding arises as a result of social pressure, 
providing convincing evidence for this claim required a 
follow up interview, in which participants are exposed 
to social pressure. Using the same logic employed by 
Royzman et al. it would not be surprising if participants 
revised their responses after being “advised to carefully 
review and, if appropriate, revise” their responses 
(Royzman et al., 2015, p. 308). From this, it appears that 
incidences of dumbfounding can be reduced by changing 
the demands of the social situation. In effect, Royzman 
et al. (2015) have shown that moral dumbfounding is 
sensitive to social pressure. Demanding consistency 
between judgement and the endorsing of principles that 
may be relevant for a judgement reduces incidences of 
dumbfounding, whereas demanding consistency between 
a judgement and information contained in the vignette 
leads to increased dumbfounding. This is not the same as 
their claim that moral dumbfounding is caused by social 
pressure. Furthermore, the role of social pressure in the 
reduced incidences of dumbfounding observed is not 
acknowledged.
Secondly, following this interview, Royzman et al. (2015) 
are still left with one participant who, by their own criteria, 
can be identified as dumbfounded (Royzman et al., 2015, 
p. 308). No explanation for the responding of this 
participant is offered, and cannot be explained by the 
theoretical position adopted in the conclusion. It is 
argued that one participant from a sample of 53, is 
not significantly greater than 0/53, z = 1.00, p = .32. 
Disregarding this estimate of moral dumbfounding as 
not statistically significant, p = .32, avoids offering an 
explanation for a response that is inconsistent with the 
argument made in the paper.
Thirdly, and most importantly, the current research 
identifies dumbfounding as a rare demonstration of 
the separation between intuitions and reasons for these 
intuitions. Practical challenges to demonstrating this 
separation have already been identified: (a) post-hoc 
rationalisation and identification of reasons that are 
consistent with a judgement; (b) the possibility that the 
intuition emerged as a result of a well-rehearsed reasoned 
response. The work presented by Royzman et al. (2015) 
may be viewed as a practical demonstration of this first 
challenge; helping participants identify reasons that 
are consistent with their judgement and providing an 
opportunity them to endorse these reasons.
As previously noted, the endorsing of a reason 
does not imply that the reason contributed to the 
judgement. This view of moral dumbfounding presents 
two methodological considerations that need to be 
addressed before accepting the claim that judgements 
in the dumbfounding paradigm can be attributed to 
either norm-based reasons or harm-based reasons. The 
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first relates to participants’ ability to articulate either 
harm-based or norm-based reasons. The second relates 
to the consistency with which these reasons guide 
judgements.
Firstly, the final study reported by Royzman et al. (2015) 
does not report whether or not participants who endorsed 
either norm-based reasons or harm-based reasons also 
articulated the same reason. The mere endorsing of a 
principle or reason does not provide evidence that this 
principle guided the making of a judgement. To illustrate 
this point, consider the following scenario:
Two friends (John and Pat) are bored one afternoon 
and trying to think of something to do. John sug-
gests they go for a swim. Pat declines stating that 
it’s too much effort – to get changed, and then to 
get dried and then washed and dried again after; 
he says he’d rather do something that requires less 
effort. John agrees and adds “Oh yeah, and there’s 
that surfing competition on today so the place will 
be mobbed”. To which Pat replies “Yeah exactly!”
When John mentioned the surfing competition Pat 
immediately adopted it as another reason not to go 
for a swim however it is clear that this reason played 
no part in Pat’s original judgement. It is possible that 
in identifying other reasons that are consistent with a 
particular judgement researchers may falsely attribute the 
judgement made to these reasons. The studies described 
by Royzman et al. (2015) do not sufficiently guard against 
the possibility of falsely attributing judgements to 
reasons endorsed, allowing for the possibility that some 
participants were falsely excluded from analysis. One way 
to avoid the false exclusion of participants would be to 
include an open-ended string response option immediately 
after the presenting of the vignette, in which participants 
are invited to provide the reason(s) for their judgement. 
Participants are then only excluded from analysis if they 
both articulated and endorsed a given principle.
Secondly, consider the harm-based reasons, or the 
application of the harm principle. Royzman et al. (2015) 
argue that if participants do not believe that no harm 
came from the actions of Julie and Mark then concerns of 
harm may be considered a legitimate reason for judging 
the behaviour as wrong. Essentially, they have identified 
the harm principle as “it is wrong for two people to engage 
in an activity whereby harm may occur”. Royzman et al. 
(2015) argue that the application of this principle provides 
participants with a legitimate reason for their judgements. 
If this principle is guiding the judgements of participants, 
then this principle should be applied consistently across 
differing contexts. Royzman do not demonstrate that the 
participants in their sample consistently apply this principle 
across differing contexts (e.g., contact sports/boxing).
Two indicators, measuring dumbfounding by differing 
standards, have been identified here: admissions 
of not having reasons, demonstrating an explicit 
acknowledgement of the absence of reasons; and 
unsupported declarations, demonstrating a failure to 
provide reasons when asked. The materials and measures 
developed here can be used in follow-up work in order 
address the methodological issues identified in the work 
of Royzman et al. (2015) and assess the strength of the 
concerns they identified in a more rigorous manner.
Limitations and Future Directions
The current research recorded variability between the 
different studies that remains unexplained. The interview 
recorded variation in responses between the different 
scenarios that was not observed in the computerised 
tasks. Possible explanations for this difference between 
computer task and interview have been offered here, 
however these are merely speculative and should be 
investigated further.
The studies presented here are exploratory in design. 
The aim was to identify whether or not the phenomenon 
of moral dumbfounding could be elicited in a robust 
fashion. There was no experimental manipulation and 
analyses were primarily descriptive. These studies raise 
significant questions about the mechanisms underlying 
dumbfounded responses to moral judgement tasks, but 
clearly indicate that such dumbfounded responses can be 
reliably elicited, and demonstrate interesting variability. 
Future research is needed to identify specific variables 
that may moderate dumbfounding; examples may include 
meaning maintenance and meaning threat (Heine et 
al., 2006; Proulx, & Inzlicht, 2012), need for closure 
(Kruglanski, 2013; Kruglanski, & Webster, 1996), or zeal 
(McGregor, 2006a, 2006b; McGregor, Nash, & Prentice, 
2012; McGregor, Zanna, Holmes, & Spencer, 2001).
Conclusion
The primary aim of the current studies was to examine 
the reliability of dumbfounded responding in moral 
judgements, and identify specific measurable indicators 
of moral dumbfounding. This is of particular interest 
considering the extent to which moral dumbfounding 
exists as a known phenomenon in the morality literature 
and its existence appears to inform theories of moral 
judgement. Two indicators of dumbfounding were 
taken: an admission of not having reasons and a failure 
to provide reasons when requested (measured by the 
providing of unsupported declarations/tautological 
responses). Four studies revealed varying rates of 
moral dumbfounding as recorded by these indicators 
depending on the type of task and on which indicator is 
being used. While further work is necessary to identify 
the specific variables that may moderate this variability, 
the research presented here demonstrated that two types 
of dumbfounded responding can be reliably elicited. In 
other words, we found that people are not always able 
to justify their moral judgements; they maintain their 
judgements in the absence of supporting reasons. In 
some cases, people resort to unsupported declarations 
as justifications for their judgements, or they admit that 
they do not have reasons for their judgement. Further 
research is required to establish why this occurs. 
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Notes
 1 In the present paper we will follow the practice of 
the majority of authors discussing dumbfounding in 
focusing on the unpublished Haidt et al. Manuscript, 
as it is freely available to download from the University 
of Virginia.
 2 Recent work by Royzman, Kim, and Leeman (2015) 
includes a demonstration of dumbfounding using the 
incest scenario. This work is an attempt to identify 
possible reasons that may be guiding the judgement 
of participants and in limiting its focus to a single 
scenario (Incest), it is not classed here as a direct 
replication of the original work by Haidt et al. (2000).
 3 These are largely theoretical arguments offering 
explanations of dumbfounding that are consistent with 
a rationalist perspective (e.g., Kohlberg, 1971; Topolski, 
Weaver, Martin, & McCoy, 2013). However Royzman, 
Kim, and Leeman (2015) present some empirical 
evidence in support of this position. This is examined, 
in detail, in the Introduction and in the Discussion.
 4 R (3.4.1, R Core Team, 2017b) and the R-packages 
afex (0.15.2, Singmann, Bolker, & Westfall, 2015), car 
(2.1.5, Fox, & Weisberg, 2011), citr (0.2.0.9047, Aust, 
2016), desnum (0.1.1, McHugh, 2017), devtools (1.13.2, 
Wickham, & Chang, 2017), estimability (1.2, R. Lenth, 
2016), extrafont (0.17, Chang, 2014), foreign (0.8.69, 
R Core Team, 2017a), ggplot2 (2.2.1, Wickham, 2009), 
lme4 (1.1.13, Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015), 
lsmeans (2.26.3, R. V. Lenth, 2016), Matrix (1.2.10, 
Bates, & Maechler, 2017), papaja (0.1.0.9492, Aust, & 
Barth, 2017), plyr (1.8.4, Wickham, 2011), reshape2 
(1.4.2, Wickham, 2007), scales (0.4.1, Wickham, 2016), 
shiny (1.0.3, Chang, Cheng, Allaire, Xie, & McPherson, 
2017), and wordcountaddin (0.2.0, Marwick, n.d.).
 5 Some differences were observed in Study 3b, however 
these existed only when scenarios were grouped by type, 
this inter-scenario variation in rates of dumbfounding 
is not equivalent to that observed in Study 1.
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